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An effective policy scheme to overcome the suboptimal low provision levels of global public 
goods is developed in this paper. By suggesting a decentralized approach to raise 
environmental public good provision levels we take account of the lack of a coercive global 
authority that is able to enforce efficient international environmental regulations. In our model 
individual regions voluntarily commence international negotiations on public good provision, 
which are accompanied by side-payments. These side-payments are financed by means of 
regional externality-correcting taxes. Side-payments and national tax rates are designed in a 
mutually dependent way. The decentralized scheme we recommend for approaching Pareto 
efficient Nash equilibria is based on the ideas of Coasean negotiations and Pigouvian taxes. 
As it is implementable for a wide class of Nash solutions, it is applicable to various 
international externality problems. 
JEL Code: F35, H23. 
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1  Introduction 
Threats to the global environment have become a main issue on the political agenda 
of countries. Since policies to combat these threats represent global public goods, free 
rider incentives prevail in the international arena. Due to the absence of an 
international authority, which can enforce environmental regulations on a global scale 
and consequently helps to overcome free-rider behavior, voluntary transnational 
environmental agreements are considered to be most capable of generating a more 
efficient environmental protection level.  
Most prominent examples of international environmental agreements are the Montreal 
Protocol which stipulates rules to protect the ozone layer and the Kyoto Protocol 
which contains rules for climate protection. The latter gives reasons for fierce disputes 
about the best way to combat global warming. This holds even more since the Kyoto 
Protocol expires in 2012 and a new international regulation – a post-Kyoto 
mechanism – has to be found. 
Recently, a price-influencing international climate protection scheme has been 
proposed by Nordhaus (2006) as a proper successor of the quantity approach of the 
Kyoto type. “This is essentially a dynamic Pigovian pollution tax for a global public 
good” (Nordhaus (2006: 32)). An international carbon tax scheme where no 
international emission limits are dictated is considered to have several significant 
advantages over the Kyoto mechanism. This scheme could also contain side-payments 
in order to motivate countries to participate.
1  
In this paper we will elaborate Nordhaus’ proposal. We will analyze how individual 
countries or regions could negotiate the design of an international carbon tax scheme 
in a decentralized way. Such decentralized bargaining is necessary, since there is no 
central global authority that can appoint compulsory tax rates to individual nations. In 
the scheme we suggest, countries offer side-payments to their opponents that are 
conditional on the level of the environmental tax rates implemented in the transfer-
receiving opponent country. For simplicity we focus on a world consisting of two 
                                                  
1 “Additionally, poor countries might receive transfers to encourage early participation”, Nordhaus 
(2006: 32). 
  2regions which enter into mutual negotiations. We investigate whether our scheme 
could Pareto-improve the outcome in global environmental protection or even 
generate a Pareto-efficient result.   
In line with Rübbelke and Sheshinski (2005) we analyze the effects of taxes and 
transfers on the level of externalities. However, our analysis differs significantly from 
their investigation, since ours deals with reciprocal global externalities while their 
analysis considers asymmetric (unilateral) international externalities with limited 
geographical impact. The asymmetry they consider is an element which is in some 
sense equivalent to the desire to redistribute in Sheshinski (2004). In Sheshinski’s 
analysis the tax on the externality-generating good contains a uniform component 
(efficiency factor) and a component that varies across households and reflects an 
income redistribution objective (redistributive factor). In contrast to Sheshinski 
(2004), the asymmetry in the model suggested by Rübbelke and Sheshinski (2005) 
just results from an asymmetric distribution of pollution. In analyzing the asymmetric 
international regional problem they combine the ideas of Coase (1960) and Pigou 
(1932) of solving externality problems. In our investigation of global environmental 
problems we revive this idea of combining the ideas of Coase (1960) and Pigou 
(1932).  
An important advantage of the mechanism is that there is no need for a central 
authority to regulate environmental policy. In practice there is in general a low 
willingness of regional governments to give away power to a central authority, see 
Falkinger, Hackl and Pruckner (1996). Furthermore, a simple scheme of mutual side-
payments is easy enough to be understood by local authorities. In particular, it 
emerges to be difficult in real word applications to determine a baseline against which 
countries set their environmental policy. Nordhaus (2006) points out that especially 
quantity limits are troublesome because of different economic growth and 
heterogeneous technological circumstances across regions. However, in our paper the 
base line of environmental policy is simply the individual rational environmental tax 
raised by regional decision makers. Countries’ eco-tax policy is evaluated relative to 
its base line, so that the opponent country does only pay transfers for the 
internalization of transboundary externalities.  
 
  3Many solutions to the free-rider problem call for coercion in order to internalize 
transboundary external effects. In line with Guttman (1978, 1987), Danziger and 
Schnytzer (1991) as well as Guttman and Schnytzer (1992), we propose a mechanism 
which neither postulates any property right on pollution nor requires any negations 
prior to the game played.
2 Local governments are free to raise eco-taxes so that the 
take-it-or-leave-it offer must meet an individual rationality constraint. As a distinctive 
feature of our paper to the existing literature we consider economies in which the 
efficient allocation of private goods is implemented by an eco-tax. The eco-tax 
revenue is then used to finance the side-payments to correct for transboundary 
externalities which stem from the neighbouring country. Hence, the suggested policy 
generates a double environmental dividend: 1) the own eco-tax corrects national 
market failures (externalities due to inefficiently high environmental pollution) and 2) 
the raised eco-tax funds induce a correction of market failures (transnational negative 
externalities) in the neighbouring country.  By means of the tax-transfer scheme a 
first-best optimum can be set up. 
With respect to the literature, several contributors have analysed the internalization of 
reciprocal externalities by means of a transfer mechanism. Oates (1972), for example, 
examines the problem of reciprocal externalities in the provision of local public goods 
arising in a federal state. He analyses the design of federal grants which achieve an 
efficient allocation in the federation. Buchholz and Konrad (1995) investigate the 
impact of strategic transfers on the private provision of public goods. Yet, the 
transfers they regard are of an unconditional type. Barrett (1995) suggests collecting 
funds from industrialized countries in order to finance greenhouse gas abatement in 
developing countries. Therefore, the funds are transferred in a conditional way. 
Barrett (1995) recommends to collect these funds by means of a matching scheme – 
like the one suggested by Guttman (1978, 1987) –, because this scheme reduces the 
industrialized countries’ incentives to take a free ride. Scheffran and Pickl (2000) also 
analyse conditionally transferred funds. They consider Joint Implementation measures 
in international climate policy, where the industrialized world can invest a fraction of 
its budget into new power plants in the developing world, using low-emission 
                                                  
2 Althammer and Buchholz (1993) revive the analysis by Danziger and Schnytzer (1991) and reveal the 
true mechanism underlying the results of the analysis by Danziger and Schnytzer (1991). Barrett (1992) 
emphasizes the relevance of Guttman’s (matching) approach as an effective means to move us closer to 
a fully cooperative outcome in international climate protection.  
  4technology. Environmental technology transfer is also investigated by e.g. Stranlund 
(1996), Itoh and Tawada (2003) and Takarada (2005). In contrast, our paper considers 
monetary transfers. 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993, 1995) analyse transfers as a means to broaden stable 
coalitions in international environmental protection. In the case of symmetric 
countries this broadening of coalitions requires the introduction of a minimum degree 
of commitment. Botteon and Carraro (1997) show for the case of heterogeneous 
parties that transfers might help to expand coalitions even without any forms of partial 
commitment. Although the analysis of stable environmental coalitions is an important 
one, our analysis does not consider coalition formation. Instead we regard countries 
non-cooperatively choosing their environmental protection levels by comparing their 
marginal effective cost and benefits of environmental protection.      
In our analysis we proceed as follows: In Section 2 we suggest a tax-transfer scheme 
to overcome inefficiencies and we present the features of our model. Section 3 is 
dedicated to the special case of a one-sided spillover. In Section 4 we extend the 
analysis to the case of reciprocal externalities. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2  The Basic Model 
2.1  Transboundary Pollution Spillovers 
Consider the case of a reciprocal spillover effect harming country i (i = 1,2). Assume 
this effect to be a negative externality in the shape of transboundary environmental 
pollution. In country i a representative household's production of the externality 
accompanies its consumption of a private good which amounts to xi. It also consumes 
a second private good of the amount yi which is not associated with an externality. It 
is assumed that households behave competitively, i.e., they ignore their own effect on 
total pollution. Furthermore, they take the other agents' pollution levels as given. The 
total environmental externalities perceived in country i amount to φ=φ(X1,X2) where 
X1 represents the total amount of the pollution-generating private good consumption 
in country 1 and X2 is the respective consumption in country 2. An eco-tax in the 




2.2  The Individual Household’s Maximization Problem 
The maximization problem of a representative household in country i can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
Max!   ui(xi,yi,φ)        (1)
 
s.t. 
B    B(p+ti)xi+yi =mi+τi-σi, 
 
where m1 denotes the level of the representative household's income, ti denotes the 
excise tax rate, τi=tixi stands for the tax funds raised from the representative 
household and σi is the amount of tax funds τi redistributed to others, such that τi-σi is 
the amount of tax funds which the representative household gets back from its 
government. It is assumed that the households are naive, i.e., they do not consider the 
effects of their behavior on τi and σi.  
 
We obtain the following first-order conditions: 
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2.3  Take-it-or-leave-it Offer 
Regional welfare maximizing decision makers in country i do not take into account 
                                                  
3 “In the case of reciprocal consumption externalities, the common interpretation of the Pigouvian 
principle calls for taxes on the externality-creating commodities” (Green and Sheshinski (1976: 798)).  
  6negative external effects they exert on neighbouring country j (j=1,2 and j≠i) and 
hence raise inefficiently low eco-taxes on the consumption of the dirty good x1. One 
method of coordinating environmental policy among regions to overcome 
inefficiently high transnational externality production is the implementation of a 
system of international side-payments. We assume that each country can make a take-
it-or-leave-it offer. Country i, for example, could offer ( ) j j t S , , i.e. country i offers a 
transfer payment   which is channeled to country j in order to induce this country to 
raise its eco-tax rate   to a certain level desired by i.  Country j can either accept or 
reject the offer. We assume that both countries can make binding commitments with 
respect to their transfer payment and eco-tax levels. Local governments 
simultaneously offer take-it-or-leave-it contracts. In doing so, each country anticipates 
the subject matter 
j S
j t
( ) k k t , S , with k = i,j, of the contract offered by the opponent.  
 
2.4  The First-best Policy 
As a reference we examine the maximization problem of a social planner who 
maximizes global welfare, i.e. the sum of both countries’ welfare. We suppose that a 
country’s welfare level is equal to the sum of the welfare levels enjoyed by the 
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where   denotes the sum of national income M M M M = + 2 1 1 in country 1 and of 
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  7where the third terms on the LHS of (5) and (6) respectively denote the marginal 
external effects of pollution. From equations (5) and (6) as well as equation (7) we 
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The first-best optimal eco-tax policy ( )
fb fb t t 2 2 ,  fully internalizes pollution externalities. 
  8 
 
3  Unilateral Externalities  
In this section we consider the special case of a one-sided pollution spillover-effect 
from country 2 to country 1. We assume that pollution is produced in both countries 
but it only affects welfare in country 1, i.e. for  0 ) , ( 2 1 > X X φ  with   it 
follows 













. One can think of the case that country 2 can easily 
adapt to the adverse effects of the global warming problem, while it will cause an 
important loss in country 1. Schelling (1992: 4-7), for example, pointed out that 
climate change would entail higher costs in countries with an important agriculture 
sector, while industrial states are less vulnerable to global warming.
4 Thus, country 2, 
which does not internalize consumption externalities in country 1, has no incentives to 
raise a positive eco-tax on the consumption of good  . However, country 1 raises 
taxes which fully internalize the adverse effects of consumption as there are no 
transboundary spillover-effects.  
2 X
 
3.1  The Relationship between Taxes and Transfers in Country 2 
The government of country 1 intends to induce country 2 to raise an eco-tax. 
Therefore it offers a take-it-or-leave-it offer which fulfills the following individual-
rational condition:    
 
( )( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , 0 Y , 0 , 0 X U S , t Y , S , t X U 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 = ,           (9) 
 
Country 2 will accept country 1’s offer if the its utility level before the tax (LHS) has 
to be at least as high as its welfare after implementation of the eco-tax (RHS). The 
utility level U of a country is assumed to be simply equal to the sum of the utility 
levels of its households and is described by indirect utility functions as employed in 
                                                  
4 Yet, mainly in developing countries the agricultural sector constitutes a main part of the economy and 
these countries are unlikely to pay positive net transfers to the developing world.  “Poorer countries are 
probably more vulnerable to climate change than wealthier countries” (Schelling (1995: 401)). And as 
the IPCC (1998: 8) stresses: “Africa is the continent most vulnerable to the impacts of projected 
changes because widespread poverty limits adaptation capabilities.”                                                          
  9(1). After taking into account the first-order conditions of the households’ decision 
problem (2) and (3) and the differentiation of the sum of all households’ budget 
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we obtain after some mathematical manipulations: 
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Thereby  I2 represents the country’s national income. By the individual rationality 
constraint (9) country 1 must compensate country 2 for the loss of regional welfare 
induced by the eco-tax  . Consequently the transfer from country 1 to country 2 has 
to be the higher, the higher the tax in country 2 desired by country 1.  
2 t
 
3.2  Country 1’s Choices  
The government of country 1 intends to maximize regional welfare. It raises an eco-
tax rate   on home consumption and induces the implementation of an eco-tax   in 
the neighbouring country 2 by take-it-or-leave-it contract as well. The government of 
the transfer paying country 1 maximizes the following indirect utility function:  
1 t 2 t
 
2 1 t , t
! Max   U1(X1(t1,S2,X2),Y1(t1,S2,X2),φ(X1,X2)),   (12) 
 
where  ) , ( 2 1 X X φ φ =  represents the total amount of environmental externalities 
perceived in country 1.  
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The calculation of country 1’s optimal choice of the tax rate t2 in country 2 which it 






















































































     (14) 
By comparing equations (13) and (14) with the first-best optimal reference solution 
derived in section 2 it becomes obvious that the choices of country 1 and therefore the 
tax-transfer scheme yields a Pareto-efficient outcome. 
 
 
4  Reciprocal Externalities 
 
Let us turn to the generalized set-up of our model with reciprocal spillover effects. 
Here, each country’s welfare is affected by pollution φ  which again depends on the 
consumption level in both countries. Unlike the unilateral problem in Section 3, both 
countries will have incentives to offer a contract to their neighbour in order to 
influence the eco-tax policy of the opponent.  
 
4.1  Relationship between Taxes and Transfers in Country 2 
Country 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to country 2. In turn, it also receives an 
  11offer by its opponent. In order to fulfill the individual rationality condition no country 
should be better off by unilaterally rejecting the offer of its opponent. We claim that 
country 2 will only accept to implement a tax when its utility after the tax (LHS) 
remains at least equal to the state before the implementation of a tax (RHS): 
 
))) , 0 , , ( , ( ), , 0 , , ( ), , 0 , , ( (
))) , , , ( , ( ), , , , ( ), , , , ( (
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2 2 2
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where  S2 represents the sum of transfers received from country 1. X2 is the 
equilibrium amount of the polluting good consumed in country 2 and Y2 is the 
respective amount of the second private good. The LHS denotes the welfare of 
country 2 if it accepts country 1’s offer ( )
*
2 2,t S . In case of a rejection of the offer it 
raises an individual rational tax t2. 




































































































   
where I2 is the net income in country 2. When we take account of conditions (2) and 












































































.   (16) 
 
Rearranging terms yields: 
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The amount of money which country 1 must at least pay to country 2 is uniquely 
determined by the choice of the tax rate  .  In particular,   is an increasing 
function of   for all  . Reciprocally, we can derive the marginal impact of   
on  . 
2 t 2 S
2 t
*
2 2 t t < 1 t
1 S
 
4.2  Transfer-paying Country 1’s Maximization Problem  
Countries 1 and 2, both intend to maximize national welfare. Counties 1 and 2 make a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer (  and  ) 2 2,t S ( ) 1 1,t S , respectively. In the simultaneous move 
game country 1 can correctly anticipate ( ) 1 1,t S  offered by country 2 and vice versa. In 
the equilibrium both countries will accept the offers of their opponents respectively 
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In order to derive country 1’s optimal choice of t2, we insert (7) and (8) aggregated 
  13over all households in country 1 and the derivative of the budget constraint for t2, 


































































































                   
 
Country 2 in turn counterbids a contract to 1 so that we can write the following 
























































































































































































































































Inserting equation (16) the equivalent marginal effect for country 1 into the system of 
equations (21) shows that the two countries with reciprocal spillover-effects can 
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5  Concluding Remarks 
 
Contemporarily, in the climate protection debate several different schemes are 
suggested to become successors of the current Kyoto scheme. Many proposals are 
based on a quantity approach, i.e. the targets of these schemes are certain levels for 
greenhouse gas abatement (e.g., 50%-emission reduction until 2050). In contrast, 
price approaches intend to raise the effective price of pollution, e.g. by levying carbon 
taxes world-wide. In this paper we focus on the analysis of the latter.     
 
We examine a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism to combat global environmental 
externalities. Countries offer a contract to neighbouring countries to influence these 
countries’ eco-tax policies. The contract includes the pledge to pay an income transfer 
to the neighbouring countries provided that these countries raise their eco-tax levels 
up to a level desired by the transfer-offering countries. 
 
Welfare losses which may go along with an increase of eco-tax rates are compensated 
by the side-payments offered in the contracts.  As a distinctive feature of our paper to 
the existing literature we propose a mechanism in which side-payments are financed 
by the revenue raised by means of the eco-taxes. Therefore there exists a double 
environmental dividend of these eco-taxes. On the one hand global externalities are 
corrected by means of the Pigouvian tax within the tax-raising country and on the 
other hand the respective tax revenue can be used for side-payments inducing other 
countries to further mitigate global environmental pollution.   
 
  15We show that in a simultaneous move game with two countries both players will offer 
a take-it-or-leave-it contract that entails a side-payment which meets the individual 
rationality constraint of the opponent player in combination with the first-best optimal 
tax policy. Therefore the suggested tax-transfer scheme represents an effective means 
to induce a global carbon-tax scheme. The scheme does not require the coercive 
power of a central global authority but carbon taxes are implemented voluntarily by 
the individual countries.     
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